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Ignorance in Congressional Voting?
Evidence from Policy Reversal on the
Endangered Species Actn
Edward J. Lo ´pez, University of North Texas
Daniel Sutter, University of Oklahoma
Objective. In 1978 Congress weakened several key provisions of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), which had been enacted only ﬁve years earlier. The objective is
to compare alternative explanations for this policy reversal. Methods. Probit and
multinomial logit models are used to explain empirically how senators voted in both
1973 and 1978, and to investigate why many senators switched their vote from
supporting ESA to weakening it. Results. The ﬁndings here indicate that party
afﬁliation and policy-maker preferences were not important to the 1973 vote, but
they were key variables in the 1978 votes and the vote-switching decision. Proxies
for unexpected economic impacts of ESA on individual states have little explanatory
power. Conclusions. Ignorance, as measured here, does not appear to explain this
policy reversal; rather, an inﬂux of relatively conservative Democrats between 1973
and 1978 presents itself as the leading explanation.
Congress passed the landmark Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973.
After the 1978 Supreme Court ruling in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
et al. (437 U.S. 153), which halted construction of the Tellico Dam to
protect the endangered snail darter, Congress amended the Act to weaken
several of its key provisions. The 1978 amendments required balancing
economic costs against species protection and created exemption procedures
for development projects. This policy reversal raises a number of questions
for political economy and environmental policy.
Policy reversals interest political economics for at least two reasons. First,
constituents’ control over their representatives remains a controversial ques-
tion. Some scholars believe politicians must faithfully represent their (or-
ganized) constituent interests or be quickly voted out of ofﬁce (Wittman,
1995). Others believe that infrequent elections and widespread voter
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ignorance produce significant slack in the principal-agent relationship,
which legislators exploit to pursue their own or special interests at their
constituents’ expense. Policy reversals allow a test for slack: with tight con-
straints, a shift in political equilibrium must be a result of a change in the
relative strength of competing interests.
1 Second, information costs play a
significant but elusive role in politics. Legislators cannot possibly know all
the details of the hundreds of votes cast each year, and ill-informed pol-
iticians can succumb to special interests and create inefﬁcient policies. In the
case of the ESA, many congressional members claimed that they thought the
Act would apply to a few dozen species of higher vertebrates and that species
preservation could not stop federal construction projects. Senate voting on
ESA provides an opportunity to test if politicians lacked (or ignored) readily
available proxies for the cost of species protection.
The early history of the ESA also provides insights into environmental
policy. Environmental protection is a public good, and thus collective-action
problems should plague interest groups seeking this goal relative to groups
seeking excludable beneﬁts. Furthermore, interest groups can attain private
advantages through legislation appearing to protect the environment
(Maloney and McCormick, 1982; Pashigian, 1985). Yet despite obvious
collective-action problems, environmental interest groups possess consider-
able political clout and few new environmental policies are ever reversed.
Species protection is particularly problematic since their protection requires
interspecies altruism. Species protection remains a topic of considerable
political interest with about 50 bills at the start of 2004 seeking to modify
the ESA. The early political history of the ESA may hold clues for its future.
We examine Senate voting on the ESA and the 1978 amendments to
identify the determinants of this policy reversal. We discuss in the next
section four possible explanations for policy reversal: (1) a shift of power
among constituents and organized interests (shift in political equilibrium);
(2) a shift of senator-specific characteristics that determine how they vote;
(3) ignorance or miscalculation by voters or senators of the ESA’s costs; and
(4) an ideological shift among senators with agenda control (party leaders or
relevant committee members). We evaluate the fourth explanation with
nonparametric analysis, then estimate probit and multinomial logit models
of the 1973 and 1978 votes to discriminate between the ﬁrst three expla-
nations. We use several variables that measure the cost of species protection
to a state, including the percent of land in the state owned by the federal
government and the number of species in the state listed as endangered in
1973 and 1978. These variables allow a rare test of the role of limited
information in policy making. We also estimate an mlogit model of the
change in senators’ votes between 1973 and 1978.
1Several recent papers (Bender and Lott, 1996; McGarrity and Sutter, 2000; Stratmann,
forthcoming) have used votes on the same issue over time to investigate the inﬂuence of
interest groups on roll-call voting.
























































Our ﬁndings indicate that state-specific and senator-specific variables ex-
plain senator voting, while the ESA variables have less explanatory power.
Party afﬁliation does not explain the 1973 vote but becomes highly sig-
nificant in the 1978 vote, whereas certain of the constituent-interest var-
iables lose explanatory power in 1978 compared to 1973. We also ﬁnd that
when party does matter to predicting the votes, it works in the opposite
direction as ideology: the probability of supporting ESA is lower for Dem-
ocrats but higher for more liberal senators. This result, we argue, seems to be
due to the historically unusual changes occurring at this time in the Senate
among party balance, regional representation, and the distribution of policy
preferences within and between the parties. Overall, the data suggest that
this policy reversal is explained partly by changes in constituent interests but
mostly by an inﬂux of Democrats, particularly conservatives from non-
southern states. Ignorance or miscalculation of the cost of species protection
does not appear to explain the reversal.
Potential Causes of Policy Reversals
A change in the balance of constituent interests provides a ﬁrst expla-
nation for a policy reversal. If voters and organized interests effectively
control politicians, then a change in policy (or roll-call votes) must result
from a change in the balance of political pressures. Marginal political ben-
eﬁts and costs determine legislator behavior in the political equilibrium view
(Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983). Policy change would result from some
combination of decreased marginal political beneﬁts or increased marginal
political costs of species protection. This could result from a change in the
relative political strength of competing interests (e.g., urban residents be-
come more numerous or inﬂuential in a state), or a change in an interest
group’s attitude toward species protection (e.g., suburbanites decide the cost
of species protection is too high). If a change in constituent interests explains
this policy reversal, then state-specific variables should be significant in our
empirical models.
Political equilibrium models typically abstract from the structures of
government. Peltzman’s model of regulation, for instance, does not include
bureaucrats or the judiciary, just a unitary political actor. Landes and Posner
(1975) extended the interest-group model to include the judiciary, and
argued that the judicial interpretation of laws according to the legislature’s
original intent would increase the durability and value of legislation. Since
the Supreme Court’s Tellico Dam decision immediately preceded the 1978
amendments, a rift between the branches of government might have con-
tributed to the policy change.
A change in legislators’ characteristics provides a second possible expla-
nation. Individual senators may update their attitudes toward species pro-
tection, or newly entering senators may have different characteristics. If there
























































is considerable slack, then these variables would have strong explanatory
power while the state-specific variables would not. But a change in con-
stituent preferences may be the cause of turning over senator characteristics
(Dougan and Munger, 1989), so significance of the senator variables, for a
given significant inﬂuence of state variables, would indicate joint power of
these two explanations.
Miscalculation of the costs of species protection by senators or constit-
uents is a third possible explanation. Miscalculation could take one of several
forms. Public policies generate nonexcludable beneﬁts, leading to the well-
known problem of rational ignorance. Some public-choice scholars argue
that pervasive public goods outcomes produce a citizenry with little interest
in acquiring knowledge of politics or the effects of policies. Indeed, even
politicians may be ill informed about many of the votes they cast. Due to
ignorance or miscalculation, Congress might have mistakenly passed an ESA
in 1973 that did not allow any balancing of the costs and beneﬁts of
protecting specific species.
2 In addition, legislators might wish to claim
ignorance as a cover for a less popular interest-group motive. Miscalculation
could also result from economizing on information costs. Obtaining accu-
rate information about the total cost and breakdown by state of species
protection costs is costly to politicians and constituents. Senators might have
acquired seemingly adequate information in 1973, and then reversed their
positions in 1978 based on realized costs. Thus miscalculation in the passage
of the ESA in 1973 may have been efﬁcient ex ante. Although descriptive
accounts of legislator behavior emphasize the cost of information, scholarly
studies of roll-call votes rarely consider the possibility of mistakes, due likely
to the difﬁculty of falsifying explanations based on mistakes. The ESA
variables allow a rare test of the miscalculation hypothesis.
An ideological shift among legislative leaders with agenda control is a
fourth possible explanation for policy reversal. The location of the median
legislator could shift because of a change in the preferences of returning
members or because of a composition effect where new senators have dif-
ferent preferences than the senators they replace (Poole and Rosenthal,
1997; Goff and Grier, 1993; McGarrity and Picou, 2001). Committees
possess de facto property rights over issues, and the institutional structure of
Congress helps determine policy outcomes (Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle and
Weingast, 1981). A change in the leadership in either chamber or a change
in the membership on the relevant oversight committees could produce a
policy reversal. Changes in oversight committee membership have been found
to produce a change in Federal Trade Commission policy (Weingast and
Moran, 1983) and monetary policy (Grier, 1991). A change in policy pref-
erences among committee members may have caused the reversal on ESA.
2The initial ESA explicitly allowed only scientific criteria when listing species and habitats.
It therefore disallowed economic criteria.
























































To evaluate the agenda control possibility, we compared the distributions
of DW-NOMINATE scores between relevant committees. DW-NOMI-
NATE scores measure a senator’s ideal point along a liberal-conservative
dimension from  1t o11, with higher scores indicating a more conserv-
ative voting record (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). An overhaul of the Senate
committee structure occurred in 1977 and jurisdiction over endangered
species changed from Commerce in 1973 to Environment and Public
Works in 1978, which suggests that agenda control might have caused this
policy reversal. The membership on these two committees, however, over-
lapped considerably and there was no statistically significant shift in the
DW-NOMINATE scores of the two committees or the Senate as a whole,
which suggests that agenda control does not explain the reversal.
3
Dependent Variables: The Votes Considered
The ﬁnal votes on the ESA and the 1978 amendments were nearly
unanimous in both the House and Senate (355–4 and 92–0 in 1973 and
384–12 and 94–3 in 1978). This low variation in a small sample leaves little
for a maximum likelihood approach to explain. Several ﬂoor amendments in
the Senate, however, were balanced enough for estimation. We therefore
estimate one vote from 1973 and ﬁve ﬂoor amendments from 1978.
  Roll Call Vote 312 (V312): To authorize the federal government to
enforce endangered species protection in states that provided inadequate
enforcement. Sponsor: Stevens (R, Alaska). Accepted 60–33. (This is the
1973 vote.)
  Roll Call Vote 216 (V216): To allow heads of federal agencies to exempt
projects from the Act, as well as construction projects under way or under
contract in 1973. Sponsor: Stennis (D, Mississippi). Rejected 76–22.
  Roll Call Vote 217 (V217): To protect endangered species only when
‘‘consistent with the welfare and national goals of the people of the
United States.’’ Sponsor: Scott (R, Virginia). Rejected 86–10.
  Roll Call Vote 218 (V218): To limit protection of the Act to species of
‘‘substantial beneﬁt to mankind.’’ Sponsor: Scott (R, Virginia). Rejected
87–2.
  Roll Call Vote 219 (V219): To limit eligibility for exemptions from the
Act to projects for which ‘‘a substantial and irretrievable commitment of
resources’’ were made before the species was found in the given location.
Sponsor: Nelson (D, Wisconsin). Rejected 70–25.
  Roll Call Vote 220 (V220): To require only four votes instead of ﬁve
from the Endangered Species Committee to approve an exemption from
the Act. Sponsor: Scott (R, Virginia). Rejected 69–23.
3Complete descriptive statistics on the Senate and the relevant committees in both years
are available from the authors on request.
























































All but V219 among the 1978 amendments would have weakened the ESA
further than the amendments that ultimately passed.
4
The near unanimous reversal by both the House and Senate on the ﬁnal
ESA votes merits discussion. Virtually all returning members voted ﬁrst to
enact ESA then to weaken it, which is evidence against a member turnover
explanation. Also any explanation based on a change in the balance of
interest-group strength must be national in breadth. Yet the ﬁnal votes
might easily overstate the change in support for species protection. Unan-
imous consent under a simple majority decision rule does not have the same
implications about consensus as unanimous consent with voluntary partic-
ipation (Holcombe, 1986; Sobel and Holcombe, 2001). Once it was clear
that the ESA and amendments would pass, the cost to Senators of voting for
the legislation falls dramatically.
Independent Variables
We use three sets of independent variables—senator-specific variables,
state-specific variables, and ESA variables—which correspond to the ﬁrst
three potential explanations discussed above. We have observations for both
1973 and 1978 for all variables except when noted. Table 1 provides de-
tailed descriptive statistics.
Senator-Specific Variables
  DEMOCRAT: Binary coded 1 for Democrats, who are usually stronger
environmental protectors.
  DW-NOMINATE: A measure of senator-specific ideology along a  1
to 11, liberal-conservative policy space, as revealed through his or her
entire past voting record (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Although a sen-
ator’s past voting record is not determined solely by ideological pref-
erences, we will follow the use of this shorthand terminology.
5
  TENURE: Number of years a senator had served consecutively in the
Senate. This variable controls for the effects of seniority and demon-
strated ability to win election to the senate.
4The amendments did not weaken the ESA as greatly as feared since appeals to the
Endangered Species Committee have been rare and the number of species listed increased in
the mid 1980s. Yet the potential for these amendments to reduce species protection is
unmistakable and environmental groups strongly opposed the amendments (Yaffee, 1982).
5Since ESA is an environmental issue, we could instead use an index of a senator’s vote
record on environmental issues only. For example, the League of Conservation Voters cal-
culates an index that places legislators on a 0 (extreme anti-environmental) to 100 (extreme
pro-environmental) space. Since senators employ the same voting calculus on both ESA and
the issues that inform LCV scores, we use the broader NOMINATE scores to avoid potential
endogeneity bias (cf. Jackson and Kingdon, 1992).



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  AGE: The senator’s age in years at the time of the vote. Environmental
protection became an important political issue in the early 1970s, so
senators of different age cohorts may have different environmental policy
preferences. Age may also affect senators’ time horizon.
Constituent Interest (State-Specific) Variables
  ENVIROS: Membership in the six largest environmental groups as a
percentage of voting-age population, as provided by Kalt and Zupan
(1984).
6 Larger environmental group membership should produce
stronger support for species protection. Data are for 1978 only.
  METRO: Percent of a state’s population living in metropolitan areas.
Urban residents tend to have a greater demand for environmental pro-
tection and also tend to bear a smaller portion of the cost of species
protection since most listed species’ critical habitats are rural areas.
  COLLEGE: Percent of a state’s population with a college degree. In-
creased education is expected to lead to greater support for endangered
species protection.
  INCOME: Per capita income in the state, measured in thousands of nom-
inal dollars. Environmental protection is generally considered a superior
good.
  UNEMPLOYMENT: The state’s unemployment rate. Species protec-
tion can adversely affect economic activity, so a higher unemployment
rate could reduce support for species protection. But employment ﬂuc-
tuations are temporary while species extinction is permanent, so a zero
coefﬁcient would be consistent with a long-term view of preservation.
  DUMEMP: The change in a state’s unemployment rate from the pre-
vious year. A rising unemployment rate might make voters less willing
to sacriﬁce economic activity.
Cost of Species Protection Variables
  FEDERAL LAND: Percentage of land in a state owned by the federal
government. Since the ESA applies in the ﬁrst instance to federal actions,
this variable measures the potential ESA costs to a state. Support for ESA
should be lower in states with more federal land.
  LIST73: Number of species indigenous to the state listed as endangered
or threatened through 1973. Species protection will be costlier in states
with more listings, producing less support for species protection. But
if states view endangered species as resources worthy of protection,
6The authors thank Mark Zupan for providing the data set from Kalt and Zupan (1984).
The six environmental groups are Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Environmental
Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, National Wildlife Federation, and Wilderness Society.
























































constituents could demand greater species protection. Data are for
1973 only.
  NEWLIST: The number of species added to a state’s list between 1973
and 1978. More new listings may alter the how a state values the tradeoff
between species protection and its economic cost. Data are for 1978 only.
7
  PROJECT: A binary variable coded 1 if the state had a major federal
project disrupted to protect the habitat of an endangered species, as
listed in Harrington (1981). The cost of species protection is higher for
these states (Colorado, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
Tennessee, and Utah), so their senators should be more likely to oppose
species protection in 1978. Data are for 1978 only.
Few empirical roll-call studies entertain the hypothesis that ignorance or
miscalculation helps determine the vote outcome. Presumably, this is due to
the lack of data measuring miscalculation. The endangered species variables
allow us to test whether constituents or senators miscalculated the cost of
species protection. FEDERAL LAND and LIST73 measure the cost of
species protection by state and were available to inform the 1973 debate.
Low predictive power for these variables in 1973, but strong predictive
power in 1978, would support the miscalculation hypothesis. The variables
NEWLIST and PROJECT proxy cost ‘‘surprises,’’ which senators and
constituents could use in updating the cost of species protection. To the
extent that these variables explain the 1978 votes, constituents or senators
may have inaccurately predicted the costs of the ESA, which could represent
a rational updating of net cost estimates, not necessarily an initial miscal-
culation of cost.
The fact that Congress weakened the ESA immediately after the Tellico
Dam appears to support the ignorance/miscalculation hypothesis. Senators
might have seen a vote for the ESA as a low-cost opportunity to signal their
commitment to the environment, yet realized and corrected their mistake
after the Tellico Dam case. This reading of events, however, ignores the
substantial ﬂexibility in the implementation of the Act. In practice, the listing
of species, the designation of critical habitat, and the issuance of jeopardy
rulings considers economic cost (Yaffee, 1982). Consultation with the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) typically leads to modiﬁcation rather
than outright halting of development projects (Rhodes and Wilson, 1995); in
only 54 of 96,832 formal or informal consultations between 1987 and 1992
did the USFWS totally block a project (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1996:117–18).
Thus we must require more systematic evidence of miscalculation.
7The number of species listed in 1973 and the number of new listings between 1973 and
1978 exhibit considerable variation across states. LIST73 ranged from 28 (Hawaii) to 0
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island) and NEWLIST ranged from 0 (various states) to
25 (Tennessee). LIST73 and NEWLIST are not highly correlated (10.168), so multicol-
linearity is not a problem.
























































Estimations of the 1973 and 1978 Votes
Estimation of the 1973 Vote
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present the results from two probit estimations
on the 1973 vote (V312). The independent variables are presented in groups,
with senator-specific variables listed ﬁrst, then the state-specific variables, and
ﬁnally the importance-of-ESA variables. Among the senator variables, ideology
(DW-NOMINATE) and TENURE are statistically significant determinants
of the 1973 vote. DW-NOMINATE has an unexpected sign—more con-
servative senators were more likely to vote for federal enforcement of the
ESA.
8 Also of note, DEMOCRAT does not explain this vote; the effect of this
variable in both magnitude and statistical significance is close to zero. AGE
and TENURE carry opposite signs as they often do in models of congressional
voting: AGE may affect the legislator’s time horizon whereas TENURE is
generally understood to measure political capital. As for constituent variables,
ENVIROS, UNEMPLOYMENT, METRO, and COLLEGE are statistically
significant. Senators from states with more environmental group members and
more urban populations were surprisingly less likely to vote in favor of species
preservation. Senators from states with higher unemployment rates (but not
rising unemployment rates) and a higher percentage of college graduates were
also more likely to vote for species protection. As for the endangered species
variables, FEDERAL LAND is a positive and significant determinant of vot-
ing while LIST73 is statistically insignificant. Note that the sign on FED-
ERAL LAND is the reverse of that predicted because states with more federal
land should bear a higher cost of species protection, ceteris paribus. We will
discuss these results further as we contrast them with the 1978 votes.
Joint Estimation of the 1978 Votes
We would like to incorporate voting on the three Scott amendments even
though individual probit estimations on these votes are not feasible. When
viewing the ﬁve amendments together, one discovers that senators voted in
well-deﬁned patterns, and the empirical determinants of these patterns offer
insight into reversal on ESA. Consider the alignment of the proposals.
Again, V219 would strengthen, and V216 weaken, the ESA. We propose the
following arrangement of the votes on a single dimension:
V216 V217-218-220 V219
(Stennis) (Scott) (Nelson)
Weakens ESA ! Strengthens ESA
8As with all results in this article, we also estimated this equation using LCV scores rather
than DW-NOMINATE and achieved similar results.
























































If this arrangement is correct and voting is sincere, we should expect con-
sistency in voting on the three Scott amendments (a positive correlation) and
inconsistency between the Stennis and Nelson amendments (a negative
correlation). The correlation coefﬁcients of the roll-call votes conﬁrm these
relationships: the Nelson amendment is negatively correlated ( 0.338) with
TABLE2
Probit Estimation of Individual Votes
1973 Vote (V312)
Column 1 Column 2
DEMOCRAT  0.107 0.008
(0.194) (0.187)






ENVIROS  0.683nn  0.947nn
(0.302) (0.312)
UNEMPLOYMENT  0.048nn __
(0.038)
DUNEMPLOYMENT __  0.170
(0.096)




INCOME  0.057 0.053
(0.143) (0.138)
FEDERAL LAND 0.008nn 0.007nn
(0.004) (0.003)












NOTES: Dependent variable51 indicates vote for stronger species protection. Marginal probability
estimates (change in probability of voting year for a continuous increase in the independent
variable) appear on the line with the variable name. These are transformed from the associated
probit coefﬁcient estimates. Robust standard errors and are reported in parentheses.
In the case of discrete variables, the marginal probability is for a change from 0 to 1.
nnnSignificant with 99 percent conﬁdence; nnsignificant with 95 percent conﬁdence; nsignif-
icant with 90 percent conﬁdence.
























































the Stennis amendment, and the three Scott amendments are all positively
correlated (in excess of 10.50). Moreover, senators tended to fall into three
categories of vote patterns on these ﬁve votes.
1. Twenty-ﬁve senators voted ‘‘nay’’ on Stennis and ‘‘yea’’ on Nelson, and
none of these voted ‘‘yea’’ on any of the Scott amendments. These 25
voted against weakening ESA.
2. Forty-six senators voted ‘‘nay’’ on both Stennis and Nelson. This might
suggest their taking a moderate position if they voted ‘‘yea’’ on the
others. But a full 38 of these voted ‘‘nay’’ on all three of the other Scott
amendments, another three voted ‘‘nay’’ on two and abstained on the
other, and the remaining ﬁve voted ‘‘yea’’ only on the procedural one
(V220). These 46 senators voted for the level of difﬁculty in exemptions
contained in the ﬁnal amendments.
3. Twenty-two senators who voted on both V216 and V219 voted ‘‘yea’’ on
Stennis and ‘‘nay’’ on Nelson. Although support among these senators
for the Scott amendments was mixed (9, 2, and 16 of these 22 voted for
V217, V218, and V220, respectively), these 22 senators voted for even
further weakening of ESA.
This suggests a trichotomous grouping of senators with the above categories
(1, 2, and 3) being coded {0, 1, 2}. This deﬁnes our multi-category dependent
variable, which we call VEXEMPT. Since VEXEMPT is not ordinal in utility,
the appropriate estimator is multinomial logit.
9 The mlogit procedure cal-
culates a set of beta coefﬁcient estimates for each category of the dependent
variable, with estimates in the selected base category set to zero. We set
VEXEMPT51 as the base category. The mlogit beta coefﬁcient estimates are
not of direct interpretive value, but can be converted to estimates of marginal
effect—deﬁned as the effect of a change in the independent variable on the
probability that the dependent variable takes a given category relative to the
probability that it takes the base category. We report these estimates.
Table 3 presents the results. The top panel presents the estimates for
VEXEMPT50 and the bottom for VEXEMPT52, relative to the base
category. A negative (positive) beta is associated with a probability ratio less
(greater) than unity, and greater deviation from unity indicates a stronger
marginal effect. We expect the relative probability estimates for Categories 0
and 2 to be on opposing sides of unity. Table 3 indicates that this expec-
tation is typically upheld, though not for every independent variable. Con-
sider party afﬁliation. In the top panel for Model 1, being a Democrat
reduces the probability of voting strongly against weakening ESA, relative to
9It may appear that the appropriate estimator is ordered probit. Oprobit applies when all
choosers believe that the higher categories of the dependent variable impart greater utility.
Clearly this is not the case, as different senators will order the categories of VEXEMPT
differently in their utility functions. For this reason, mlogit is appropriate despite the ap-
parent ordinal character of this dependent variable.
























































the probability of voting neutral, by an estimated factor of 10 (or 1/0.099).
In the bottom panel of Model 1, being a Democrat increases the probability
of voting strongly in favor of weakening ESA, relative to voting neutrally, by
an estimated factor of 38.54. The relative probability estimate on DW-
NOMINATE is close to zero in Category 0 but quite large in Category 2,
TABLE3
Multinomial Logit Estimation of 1978 Votes
Relative Prob. Est. Robust t-Statistic 95% CI
VEXEMPT50( N525)
DEMOCRAT 0.099nn  1.71 0.007 1.41
AGE 0.980  0.34 0.878 1.09
TENURE 0.982  0.25 0.852 1.13
DWNOM 0.00024nnn  3.03 1.12e
 06 0.052
ENVIROS 0.648  0.22 0.014 29.47
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.378 0.89 0.677 2.80
DUNEMPLOYMENT — — — —
METRO 1.01 0.65 0.965 1.07
COLLEGE 1.38n 1.78 0.967 1.97
INCOME 0.484  0.80 0.082 2.85
FEDERAL LAND 0.945  1.52 0.880 1.01
LIST73 1.003  0.029 0.780 1.29
NEWLIST 0.832  0.83 0.541 1.28
PROJECT 0.00 0.00 0.00 —
VEXEMPT52( N522)
DEMOCRAT 38.54nn 2.14 1.36 1092
AGE 1.13n 1.91 0.996 1.29
TENURE 0.977  0.033 0.853 1.12
DWNOM 995nnn 2.67 6.33 156470
ENVIROS 0.0004n  1.91 1.62e
 07 1.27
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.063 0.18 0.550 2.05
DUNEMPLOYMENT — — — —
METRO 0.970  1.15 0.921 1.02
COLLEGE 1.19 1.05 0.858 1.67
INCOME 3.16 1.20 0.482 20.74
FEDERAL LAND 1.05 1.27 0.973 1.13
LIST73 0.944  0.49 0.751 1.19
NEWLIST 0.979  0.27 0.818 1.17
PROJECT 2.32 0.41 0.043 125.7




nnnSignificant with 99 percent conﬁdence; nnsignificant with 95 percent conﬁdence; nsignif-
icant with 90 percent conﬁdence.
NOTES: Dependent variable VEXEMPT5{0, 1, 2} indicates voting {against, neutral, for} weak-
ening ESA (making exemptions easier). VEXEMPT51( N546) is the base (comparison) cat-
egory. Reported point estimates are probability ratios of falling in the category relative to the
base category. These are transformed from the associated m-logit coefﬁcient estimates. The
probability ratios are lower bounded by zero. The signs on the beta estimates are preserved in
the signs on reported t-statistics.
























































and both are significant with 99 percent conﬁdence. Thus conservative
senators are far more likely to vote neutrally than to vote against weakening
ESA, and far more likely still to vote to weaken ESA than to vote neutrally.
The mlogit estimates indicate an atypical result: that ideology and party
work in opposite directions. As for constituent variables, COLLEGE in-
creases the probability of voting against a weaker ESA, while ENVIROS
reduces the probability of voting for a weaker ESA. Interestingly, none of the
ESA variables is statistically significant, nor are their effects unambiguous on
the 95 percent conﬁdence interval (they all straddle unity).
10 We also ran
individual probit estimations on V216 and V219 (the sufﬁciently balanced
votes). These support our mlogit ﬁndings on VEXEMPT, that party and
ideology dominate the explanatory power in 1978, with some constituent-
interest variables playing roles as well. The ESA variables, however, do not
have significant explanatory power.
11
Analysis of Vote Switching
The voting data reveals that many senators who voted on V312 in 1973
switched their support for the ESA in 1978. We now analyze the deter-
minants of which senators switched their votes as opposed to those who
maintained their position on the ESA. Two modeling problems arise in
deﬁning a dependent variable to measure vote switching. The ﬁrst concerns
the 33 senators who left ofﬁce between 1973 and 1978. Analysis of vote
switching could observe only those senators who cast votes in both roll calls
or observe all states whose senators voted in both years even if they replaced
their senators. The appropriate sample depends on whether the member
or the district is the appropriate unit of choice. If senators are good agents
of their constituents’ interests, then the senate seat is the appropriate unit,
but the member is the appropriate unit of observation if members can
pursue their own preferences in ofﬁce. Since the evidence on shirking
10We constructed variations on NEWLIST to investigate a possible nonlinear effect of new
listings. First, fully half the states had zero new listings so we deﬁned NEWLIST2 as a binary
variable equal to 1 if a state had any new listings. We also found that 38 states had between
one and ﬁve new listings, whereas 12 states had between 7 and 28, so we deﬁned another
variation NEWLIST3 as {0, 1, 2} for {0, 1–5, 7–28} new listings. Finally, we deﬁned dummy
variables NEWD251 for states with 1–5 new listings, and NEWD351 for states with 7–
28. None of these alternative speciﬁcations, however, performed significantly different.
11A referee suggested that we more closely proxy the state-by-state costs of ESA using
measures of economic development: the more economic development, the costlier ESA
would be to a state, and the less supportive of ESA a senator would be, ceteris paribus. We
gathered the data for the appropriate years by state for three variables: (1) miles of interstate
highways constructed; (2) total costs of dams constructed; and (3) construction spending.
Then we reestimated all the above models, adding one of these variables at a time. Our
essential result holds up: none of these variables exhibits consistent explanatory power in the
individual vote models, and none is statistically significant in the VEXEMPT model. Details
are available from the authors on request.
























































suggests that the agency problem is not too severe (Bender and Lott, 1996),
we use the seat as our unit of observation. We control for turnover with a
binary variable RETURNER, which is set to 1 if the same senator held the
seat in 1978 as in 1973.
The second modeling issue is a potential selection problem related to
missing voting data. Nine senate seats failed to cast a vote on both V312 and
V216. Let the dependent variable VSWITCH categorize senators according
to whether they maintained opposition/support or switched their vote. To
this end, VSWITCH takes the following categories.
  0 if senator voted against ESA in 1973 and then for ESA in 1978;
  1 if senator voted for ESA in both years; and
  2 if senator voted for ESA in 1973 and then against ESA in 1978.
To explain the overall policy reversal on ESA, we are most interested in the
determinants of Category 2. Considering the 91 seats for which senators cast
votes on both V312 and V216, the count in each category {0, 1, 2} is {32,
39, 19}.
12 Ignoring these nine in an mlogit is problematic since the decision
not to vote is related to the alternatives being voted on.
13 Instead of drop-
ping these observations, we could combine them into a fourth category, but
these nine senators would not necessarily have voted all alike and thus do not
clearly belong in the same category. Our approach is to calculate ﬁtted
values—that is, predictions of how these senators would have voted on V312
and V216—using probit models. The nine senators are then individually
assigned to one of the above three categories based on the predicted prob-
abilities, after which the count in each category {0, 1, 2} of VSWITCH is
{32, 46, 21}.
14 Hence, a state’s senator switched votes 53 times and main-
tained position 46 times.
Table 4 reports mlogit estimation of VSWITCH with the base category
set to 1, so the results are read the same was as the mlogit in Table 3. Table 4
reports two different speciﬁcations, however; one with levels and another
with changes in the independent variables. The pattern in these results sheds
important light on why Congress reversed direction on the ESA. First,
12The sum of these three categories is only 90, not 91. In fact, one senator voted against
ESA in 1973 and also in 1978, but this is not enough observations to add a fourth category.
We ignore this one senator in estimating VSWITCH.
13Note that there was missing voting data regarding our earlier estimation on VEXEMPT
as well, and the model includes only 93 observations as a result. As an informal test, we
checked the results reported in Table 4 against the same model run on four categories, after
placing the remaining seven into a fourth category. The estimates for Category 0 and 2 stayed
statistically the same, and no variables except DEMOCRAT were significant in the fourth
category. The stability of the estimates after adding this fourth category implies that ex-
cluding these seven observations was not biasing our results. These results are available from
the authors on request.
14An appendix to this article contains a complete explanation of our procedure. It is
available from the authors on request.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































consider the endangered species variables. If miscalculation drove the policy
reversal on the ESA, these variables should be statistically significant de-
terminants of Category 2 (for-then-against ESA). Yet none of the species
variables is statistically significant in this category. Only in Category 0
(against-then-for ESA) do we see that LIST73 increases, and NEWLIST
decreases, the probability of switching from against to for (relative to for-
then-for ESA). This makes sense if listings as of 1973 were seen as a cost of
ESA while new listings between 1973 and 1978 were seen as resources in
need of protection. PROJECT is not an important explanatory variable
here. FEDERAL LAND tends to decrease the relative probability of voting
for-then-against, but with a t-statistic of  1.07 its sign in Category 2 is
negative with only 75 percent conﬁdence. Thus we ﬁnd no evidence that the
cost of species protection or cost ‘‘surprise’’ variables led senators to switch
their position on ESA. If the Act was inefﬁcient then senators evidently took
account of this in their initial voting decisions.
15
Next, consider the state-specific constituency variables. Here, too, we see
only a minor role among these variables in Category 2. A rising unem-
ployment rate (in Model 1) and an increasingly college-educated populace
(in Model 2) both increase the relative probability of switching from for to
against ESA. As with the endangered species variables, the constituency
variables exert most of their inﬂuence in Category 0. ENVIROS, for ex-
ample, increases the relative probability of voting against-then-for, but is
insignificant in Category 2. Similarly, METRO is positive and significant in
Category 0 but insignificant in Category 2. The remaining constituent var-
iables are insignificant in both categories. Based on these results, it appears
that a shift in the balance of constituent interests played a small role in
reversing direction on the ESA.
Finally, consider the senator-specific variables. Party afﬁliation is unim-
portant in Category 0, indicating that being a Democrat did not affect the
relative probability of voting against-then-for. But in Category 2, DEMO-
CRAT is large in magnitude and of statistical significance. Combined with
the increase in the size of the Democratic majority between 1973 and 1978
(from 56 to 61 seats), this variable appears to have been central to the overall
reversal on ESA. But why would party work opposite ideology? Examining
the inﬂuence of DW-NOMINATE on VSWITCH, more conservative sen-
ators were more likely to reverse position from supporting to opposing ESA.
Although there was a slight liberal drift of the overall chamber from a mean
of  0.077 in 1973 to  0.103 in 1978, other changes occurring in the
Senate during this period help explain the contribution of this variable to
reversal on ESA. First, Republicans lost ﬁve seats while shifting to the left
and becoming higher in variance. Democrats gained ﬁve seats and shifted to
the right. Democrats also effectively replaced two southern liberals with two
15We reestimated VSWITCH adding the measures of economic development discussed in
note 11, but none were statistically significant.























































SUNCORRECTED PROOF nonsouthern conservatives.
16 Thus, the Democratic shift to the right was
greater in magnitude than the Republican shift to the left and, as a result, there
were more Democrats in 1978, who were more conservative, and who were
more likely to switch their vote from supporting ESA to opposing the Act.
RETURNER is not significant in either category, indicating that state and
senator characteristics mattered more to VSWITCH than the identity of the
senator. This suggests that senators tended to vote the way constituents
wanted them to on this issue.
Tests of joint significance bolster our overall interpretation. Removing
one set of variables (senator, state, and ESA) at a time from Model 1 in
Table 4, we compared the three restricted models. As can be seen in Table 4,
the log likelihood in the unrestricted model is  50.93. The log-likelihood
values and associated likelihood ratio test statistics for each of the restricted
models are as shown in Table 5.
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that any of our three sets of variables
does not belong in the model. Although all three groups of variables pass the
minimum test of joint significance, the endangered species variables con-
tribute the least to the likelihood function while senator-specific variables
contribute the most.
Finally, consider the potential role of the Supreme Court in this policy
reversal. If the Court had markedly changed its interpretation of environ-
mental laws, the 1978 amendments might merely have reestablished the
1973 policy and not reversed it. To explore this possibility, we examined all
Supreme Court decisions in the 1970 and 1977 terms for evidence of a shift
in position on environmental protection. The Court decided only one
TABLE5
Log-Likelihood Values and Associated Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics
Log-Likelihood w
2-test Significant With
Senator-specific variables (4 df)  74.03 46.2 499%
Constituency variables (5 df)  67.35 16.42 499%
Endangered species variables (4 df)  56.74 11.62 497.5%
16Summary statistics for DW-NOMINATE scores for senators by party in 1973 and 1978
are as follows:
1973 1978
Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max N
Republicans 0.198 0.282  0.411 0.659 44 0.176 0.303  0.481 681 39
Democrats  0.294 0.233  0.717 0.243 56  0.281 0.238  0.717 0.496 61
Southern Dems  0.001 0.186  0.429 0.243 15  0.059 0.156  0.281 0.286 18
























































environmental case in 1970, so we cannot make any conclusions regarding
a trend.
17 In another major environmental case during the 1977 term, how-
ever, the Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc.,e ta l . (438 U.S. 59) upheld the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson
Act, which limits the liability of private companies for accidents at nuclear
power plants. A Court pursuing an activist environmental agenda could have
crippled the nuclear power industry by ruling this Act unconstitutional. The
Court’s rulings on the ESA and Price-Anderson seem consistent with Landes
and Posner’s (1975) model of the judiciary in interest-group politics, in
which courts interpret legislation as written to increase the durability and
value of statutes.
Conclusion
Our analysis offers several insights regarding Congress’s reversal on species
protection in the 1970s. First, we can through nonparametric analysis rule
out a change in the composition of the overall Senate or the relevant over-
sight committees as a likely cause. Second, we ﬁnd that senators were re-
sponsive to constituent interests: environmental variables such as
ENVIROS, economic variables such as unemployment, and demographic
variables such as COLLEGE, are good predictors of the way senators voted.
Third, the senator’s party and ideology were relatively unimportant in the
1973 votes but significantly explained the 1978 votes. In general, it seems
apparent that the coalitions regarding species protection were well formed by
1978, and that these coalitions tended to follow party lines. It is also possible
that ESA had become a sufﬁciently ideological issue—identifying a senator
as conservative or liberal—that the senators almost had to vote party lines or
consistently with their overall voting reputation in 1978. Perhaps our most
surprising result comes from our contribution to the much discussed but
rarely tested claim of ignorance in congressional voting. The ESA variables
allow us to formulate refutable hypotheses regarding senators’ ignorance of
the costs of the Act. The species protection cost variables matter little to how
senators voted or whether they switched their support for ESA. Our results
do not support the assertion that senators were ignorant or miscalculated the
costs of the initial 1973 ESA.
A shift of policy-maker preferences, particularly an inﬂux of more con-
servative Democrats, is a better explanation. If the inﬂux was due to changes
in constituent preferences, our story is consistent with a ‘‘composition ef-
fect’’ (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), by which newly entering members are
the key to a change in equilibrium policy. Indeed, the variable RETURNER
17The 1970 case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. et al. (401 U.S. 493), involved
allowing the state court in Ohio to hear a case against polluters and was decided on narrow
procedural grounds.
























































does not exert explanatory power in the vote-switching model, supporting
the view that there was little slack in voting on ESA. In this case, models of
rational political equilibrium (Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983) would explain
this policy reversal more so than ignorance or miscalculation. The extra twist
in this case was the role of the Supreme Court, which seemingly failed to
enforce the legislative bargain enacted in 1973. Landes and Posner (1975)
argue that courts increase the durability and value of legislation by inter-
preting the law according to Congress’s intent. The reason for the Court’s
decision in this case and its implications for the interest-group theory of
government remain important questions for future research.
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